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COMMENT
Criminalizing Sexual Transmission of HIV: Oklahoma's
Intentional Transmission Statute: Unconstitutional or
Merely Unenforceable?
Those who make the laws are to govern by promulgated established
laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich
and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman at plow. This is
a maxim of constitutional law ...'
L Introduction
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has been an ominous presence
in society for over a decade.2 Health authorities have argued that education and
counseling about the disease should be the primary method used to control its
spread.3 Recently, legislators have realized that some individuals may be intention-
ally transmitting the virus.4 As a response to these deliberate transmissions, states
have attempted to use traditional criminal law to punish, deter, and prevent the
intentional spread of AIDS.' Such prosecutions have resulted in convictions for
activity not medically proven to spread H1V.6 Realizing the shortcomings of
traditional criminal law,7 states have passed HIV-specific statutes in an attempt to
1. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, CONSITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 483 (6th ed. 1890).
2. GARY P. WORMSER ET AL., AIDS AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF HIV INFECTION 18 (1987).
3. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH
9-13 (1986).
4. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INST. OF MEDICINE, NAYL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE 1988, at 83 (1988).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding the biting of a prison
guard by an HIV-infected inmate to be sufficient grounds to convict inmate for assault with a deadly
weapon); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that defendant with ARC who
spit, scratched, bit, and hurled blood at police officers, convicted of attempted murder); State v.
Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (finding a bite from an inmate to be battery of
correction officer); State v. Weeks, No. 15-183 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1989) (stating that an HIV-infected
defendant who spat at prison guard was guilty of attempted murder).
6. See e.g. United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding the biting of a prison
guard by an HIV-infected inmate to be sufficient grounds to convict for assault with a deadly weapon);
Weeks v. Texas, No. 92-1154 (Texas Ct. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that an HIV-infected defendant who
spat at prison guard was guilty of attempted murder and given life sentence).
7. See Thomas W. Tierney, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV. An International
Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COmp. L. REV. 475, 491-99 (1992).
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eliminate these weaknesses! Oklahoma has passed such a statute, codified at title
21, section 1192.1.
This comment discusses the discriminatory impacts of Oklahoma's statute. Part
II of this comment provides a general understanding of AIDS. Part III addresses the
Oklahoma HIV transmission statute and examines problems accompanying its
enforcement. Part IV discusses and illustrates the statute's equal protection ramifica-
tions and argues that the group of people most prone to discriminatory enforcement
of the statute, homosexuals, are a suspect class under both federal and state
constitutional law. The section concludes that Oklahoma's -IV-transmission statute
violates equal protection. Finally, part V of this comment suggests possible
alternatives to the present statute that would concurrently meet the goals of the
statute while evading the problems engendered by the current scheme.
II. Facts About AIDS
A. Background
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (IRV) is a virus that attacks and destroys
the human immune system.9 Specifically, HIV prevents the production of, and in
some cases, destroys, those cells in the immune system that are vital to defending
against illness."0 When the body is infected with HIV, diseases that are normally
easily treated become extremely difficult to control." Likewise, exceptionally rare
cancers once found only in older men appear with alarming frequency in much
younger men as a result of the onset of AIDS. Although AIDS is inherently fatal,
people have lived as long as eight years after being diagnosed with the disease. 3
However, most AIDS patients live an average of 12.5 months after being diagnosed
with AIDS."4
Most people infected with HIV live for an extended period without showing any
clinical symptoms. Because this period of latency can last from as little as two
years to as much as seven years, people can only determine their HIV status through
testing."5
8. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, § f2-16.2 (Smith-Herd Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West
Supp. 1992); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 18-601.1 (Supp. 1990); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
333.5210 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §
50-18-112 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-20-17 (Supp. 1991); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1991).
9. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS 116 (1989) [hereinafter MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS].
10. Id. at 123.
11. S. Sheppard, Medical and Public Health Overview of HIV Infection, in AIDS PRACTICE
MANUAL: A LEGAL AND ED JCATIONAL GUIDE 2-1, 2-8 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 1991).
12. WORMSER Er AL., supra note 2, at 3.
13. See, e.g., George F. Lemp et al., Survival Trends for Patients with AIDS, 263 JAMA 402, 403
(1990).
14. Id




In Africa, where the disease likely began, AIDS is "galloping across" the
continent, devastating as much as one third of the adult population. 6 It has been
projected that by the year 2015 more than seventy million cases of AIDS will exist
in the countries south of the Sahara Desert. 7 Studies in Africa strongly suggest
that the deaths due to AIDS will exceed the country's births within a few decades."
As of December 31, 1991, over 133,232 people have died from AIDS in the
United States." Estimates predict that between 390,000 and 480,000 cases of AIDS
will have been reported by the end of 19930 Two-thirds of these people will have
died by then2 ' AIDS is the leading cause of death for men between the ages of
25 and 44 in New York City, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, and for black
women between the ages of 15 and 44 in New Jersey?' Women are becoming
increasingly at risk for AIDS and are the fastest growing group in the country
infected with HIV.' Women's death rates quadrupled from 1985 to 1988.' AIDS
is the leading cause of death for women between the ages of 25 and 34 in New
York City.? The Center for Disease Control determined that 31% of these women
contracted the virus through heterosexual intercourse.? Tragically, a study has
shown that 40% of the women currently infected with HIV felt they did not engage
in unsafe or high-risk behavior. 7
B. Treatment
While there is no known cure for AIDS', progress has been made in slowing
down the "opportunistic infections" associated with this disease.' The anti-viral
drug, zidovudine (AZT), helps prevent further decline.' However, AZT has toxic
side effects 3a ' and the HIV can develop an immunity to AZT over time. 2
A newer drug recently approved by the Food and Drug Administration,
dideoxyinosine (ddI), has actually increased the quantity of T433 cells in patients?4
16. ALAN H. TERL, AIDS AND THE LAW: A BAsic GUIDE FOR THE NONLAWYER at xv (1992).
17. Id.
18. Id. at xvi.
19. The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome - United States, June
1981-Dec. 1991,41 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL- MMWR (MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.)
28 (1992).
20. Estimates of HIV Prevalence and Projected AIDS Cases: Summary of a Workshop, Oct. 31-Nov.
1, 1989, 39 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MMWR (MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.) 110,
117 (1990).
21. Id.
22. TERL, supra note 16, at xvi.









32. Id. at 481.
33. See generally MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS, supra note 9, at 123 (stating that T4 cells are those
1993]
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Although the medical community is frantically searching for a cure, none is
expected for several years.35
C. Transmission
HIV has been medically proven to be transmitted in limited ways: sexual contact,
the sharing of contaminated needles, blood transfusion, and perinatally.' Although
the virus has been detected in bodily fluids such as blood, tears, saliva, and
semen,37 HIV cannot be contracted through casual contact." Likewise, HIV
cannot be transmitted through air, food, water, or fomites." Since universal testing
of all donated blood began in 1985, incidents of transmission through blood
transfusions have been extremely low.'
Engaging in high-vsk sexual activity, such as unprotected oral, anal or vaginal
intercourse, may allow the virus to enter through breaks, tears, or mucous
membranes in the mouth, rectum, or vagina.4' Although condom use decreases the
danger of transmitting the virus, condoms are not fail-safe.42 Sharing needles
during intravenous drug use is also highly dangerous.43 Children usually contract
the virus through their mothers, either before (perinatally), during, or after birth
(through breast feeding).
D. Societal Response
AIDS was first setn as a disease infecting only homosexuals.45 One author
discussing the fear associated with AIDS states:
Stigma goes beyond AIDS patients to anyone considered at risk of
carrying the info-ction. Indeed, not only have AIDS patients been subject
to discrimination but the public response to the disease has been
accompanied by a rise in attacks on homosexuals. Fire officials have
cells which protect against illness and are most vulnerable to HIV).
34. Tierney, supra note 7, at 482.
35. Id.
36. WORMSER Er AL, supra note 2, at 26.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 28.
39. id.
40. Tierney, supra note 7, at 484.
41. See Lawrence A. Kingsley et al., Risk Factors for Seroconversion to Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Among Male Homosevuals, I LANCET 345, 348 (1987).
42. Condomsfor Prevention of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 37 CENTERS FOR DIsEAs CONTROL:
MMWR (MORBIDITY & MCRTALrrY WKLY. REP.) 133, 134 (1988).
43. Ellie E. Shoenbaurn et al., Risk Factors for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
Intravenous Drug Users, 321 NEv ENG. J. MED. 874 (1989).
44. Tierney, supra note 7, at 483.
45. WORMSER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3; see also Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to
Social Policy, 14 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 235 (stating that underlying fears of homosexuality
give rise to fear of transmission). An illustration of this mindset in the federal government is given by
President Reagan's former speechwriter, Pat Buchanan: "The poor homosexuals - they have declared




refused to resuscitate men they suspected might be homosexuals. Police
have worn gloves when approaching suspects in some municipalities.m
Many of the fears connected with AIDS reveal underlying concerns about contagion
and contamination as well as sexuality.47 Portions of the public remain in a state
of confusion, fear, and misinformation.m Disputes and controversy over allowing
HIV-positive children to attend school, over infected inmates, and over liability in
the work place continue 9 Poor funding resulting in haphazard attempts at allaying
the "dis-ease" of the public has done little to diminish the fear surrounding AIDS.-
One scholar has encouraged the creation of a comprehensive health policy based
on (1) explicit and exhaustive sexual education programs; (2) increased support for
drug treatment; and (3) increased availability of sterile syringes and needles for
addicts outside the reaches of treatment." It has also been suggested that pervasive
discrimination against homosexuals be stopped.' Only by addressing the discrimi-
nation and educating the public will the spread of AIDS be effectively abbreviated.
To do this successfully, a delicate balance must be struck between governmental
power and individual liberties. Political bodies and the legal community as a whole
are obligated to legislate to curtail the spread of AIDS. Simultaneously, these bodies
must accomplish this formidable task without infringing on the rights of those who
are or might be victims of the disease and thus most directly impacted by the
legislation.
III. Oklahoma's Criminal Statute
A. Legislative Background
The Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic
recommended that HIV-specific statutes be adopted to address the intentional
transmissions of HIV.'3 These statutes should give "clear notice of socially
unacceptable standards of behavior specific to the HIV epidemic, and tailor
punishment to the specific crime of HIV transmission."'
46. Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE
231, 234 (1986). An illustration of the stigma surrounding the "Who knows who has the disease?"
dilemma is offered by the ultraconservative William F. Buckley, who suggested mandatory universal
screening with all seropositive individuals being tattooed on their forearms and buttocks. Id. at 236. Such
a recommendation conjures up images of another time when like-minded individuals were advocating
the identification of segments of the population with yellow stars and pink triangles and "housing" them
in concentration camps.
47. Id.
48. WORMSER Er AL, supra note 2, at 13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Leon Eisenberg, The Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Public's Response to Science, 14 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 243, 247-48 (1986).
52. Id. at 248.
53. Tierney, supra note 7, at 499.
54. Id.
1993]
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Responding to these societal and political pressures, Oklahoma passed a statute
in 1988 criminalizing the intentional transmission of HIV.' The statute read: "It
shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any activity with the intent to infect
or cause to be infected any other person with the human immunodeficiency
virus." To eliminate the vagueness and overbreadth of this language,5 the state
legislature amended the statute in 1991." The current statute reads:
§ 1192.1. Knowingly engaging in conduct reasonably likely to transfer
HIV virus - Penalties
A. It shall be unlawful for any person knowing that he or she has
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or is a carrier of the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and with the intent to infect
another, to engage in conduct reasonably likely to result in the transfer
of the person's own blood, bodily fluids containing visible blood, semen,
or vaginal secretions into the bloodstream of another, or through the
skin or membranes of another person, except during in utero transmis-
sion of blood or bodily fluids, and:
1. the other person did not consent to the transfer of blood, bodily
fluids containing blood, semen, or vaginal secretions; or
2. the other pe.'son consented to the transfer but at the time of giving
consent had not been informed by the person that the person transfer-
ring such blood or fluids had AIDS or was a carrier of HIV.
B. Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the custody
of the Department of Corrections for not more than five (5) years.59
A floor amendment prior to the passage of the final version was proposed and
adopted by the House of Representatives, which would have made it illegal for a
food handler infected with HIV to work in any restaurant in the state.' It is
impossible for the disease to be transmitted in this manner."' Although this
amendment was not adopted by the Senate, the fact that such an amendment could
be adopted by even one branch of the state legislature illustrates the ignorance and
fear that surrounds the disease.
B. Discussion
Oklahoma's amended version of its intentional transmission of HIV statute
compensates for many of the afflictions suffered by both its predecessor and similar
statutes from other states.' For example, an Illinois statute has been attacked as
55. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1988).
56. Id.
57. Discussing the blatant constitutional shortcomings of Oklahoma's original statute is beyond the
scope of this comment.
58. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1992).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See WORMSER ET At.., supra note 2, at 28.




unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and for failing to give adequate warning as
required by the Due Process Clause.' Many HIV-specific criminal statutes
proscribe conduct that has not been medically proven to transmit HV or are so
vague that the statute could be used to criminalize "safe" conduct.' Several courts
have convicted people for conduct that has not been shown to transfer the HIV
virus. Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a conviction imposing
a life sentence for attempted murder on an MIV-infected inmate who spat on a
prison guard.'
Oklahoma's statute limits culpable conduct to that which has been proven capable
of transmitting HIV. However, Oklahoma's statute is still far from perfect. Although
Oklahoma's statute poses fewer problems than similar statutes in other states, it is
still plagued with defects that may render the statute unconstitutional or unenforce-
able. First, although the statute seems to require specific intent, a court could
interpret the statute to require a lower intent standard. The intent requirement as
written - and correctly interpreted - presents an almost insurmountable burden
of proof for the prosecution. Second, the proscribed conduct could be overly vague.
Third, in addition to the vague intent requirement, the statute has other vague
provisions which may make it unenforceable or render it unconstitutional. These
problems lend to the statute's inability to be enforced.
C. Problems
Oklahoma's statute as written poses several problems that substantially impair its
effectiveness. These defects implicate the statute's constitutionality as well as its
ability to be enforced.
1. The Necessary Intent
At first reading, it appears that the statute requires the specific intent of
"knowingly" transmitting HIV to the victim. Specifically, the statute requires the
defendant to (1) know of his or her status as an IV carrier, and (2) intend to infect
another with HIV.'
A threshold problem is determining whether the defendant knew of his or her
IV-positive status; this could be established by subpoenaing test results indicating
Vague or Politically Vogue?, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 483 (1991).
63. Id. Illinois' statute was attacked because: (1) it encouraged "social scapegoating of politically
powerless groups"; (2) the statute failed to deter the intentional behavior likely to spread AIDS; (3) the
statute may actually increase the spread of the virus by discouraging testing; and (4) the statute as written
posed severe problems of proof. Id. at 484.
64. See IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting transfer or attempt to transfer any bodily
fluid, including saliva); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 § 5/12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1993) (prohibiting
exposure of bodily fluid of one to another in manner that could result in infection); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-18-112 (1989) (proscribing knowingly exposing another to infection, but failing to define terms);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West Supp. 1990) (stating it is illegal to administer or cause HIV
to be taken by another person).
65. Texas Court Lets Stand Life Sentence of Inmate Convicted of Spitting on Guard, AIDS POL'Y
& LAw, Oct. 1992, at 1.
66. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1992).
1993]
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HIV positive status. However, these test results may be confidential or protected by
a privilege. If the state may compel disclosure of test results of a highly private
nature, the consequences could be drastic. People who become aware of the
government's ability to expose one's test results may forego testing to establish a
basis for limiting future liability. 7 People may also be afraid to be tested because
confidentiality will no longer be absolute.
In addition, many HIV tests are anonymous. It is therefore highly likely that a
defendant who intends to transmit HIV will have first taken the precaution of being
tested anonymously. If a defendant is culpable enough to deliberately transmit HIV,
he or she is reprehensible enough to deliberately avoid potential liability by being
tested anonymously.
Should the state choose to abrogate one's right of confidentiality in HIV testing
matters, then the criminal statute will seriously undermine the overall public policy
behind the law, and in fact, could conceivably promote the spread of HIV. Lack
of confidentiality may discourage people from seeking treatment and testing. ' This
in turn could result in people unaware of their HIV-positive status engaging in
activity with a high likelihood of transferring the disease. It is important to
remember the statute is not designed to prevent people from engaging in high-risk
behavior. Rather, the statute merely proscribes engaging in high-risk behavior
knowing that one is HI[V-positive and intending to transmit the virus via the unsafe
conduct.
The state could also prove the defendant's knowledge through admissions to
family, friends, sexual partners, or others. Again, this method poses functional
problems. The state would have to intrude into the personal lives of many people
associated with HIV-positive individuals. Although the United States Supreme Court
has stated that government should not intrude upon an individual's right to privacy
in sexual relationships,0 courts have indicated that this right may be overridden by
a compelling state interest, such as prevention of the spread of AIDS.7 It has been
argued that a law that would justify such a "massive governmental intrusion" into
innocent people's personal lives would be excessively overbroad.' Such a law
would "encompass a great deal of sexual activity that presents no threat of harm to
others in pursuit of the few instances of sexual activity that do."'7
67. Tierney, supra note 7, at 487.
68. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INST. OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 9-13 (1986)
(stating that educating and counseling the public about the modes of transmission of AIDS is the
paramount method for deterring spread of disease).
69. Tierney, supra note 7, at 489.
70. See Eisenstadt v. Barird, 405 U.S. 438,453-54 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-68
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
71. Lisa Black, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: New Jersey Assembly Bill 966, 15 SETON HALL
LEGis. J. 193, 207 (1991) (stating that proper governmental interest can justify revealing otherwise
protected test results) (citing United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.
1980).





Assuming the state could successfully prove the defendant's knowledge, the state
must then determine whether the defendant had the "intent to infect another."'74
Courts have held that the determination of criminal intent is a factual question rarely
demonstrated by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the facts and circum-
stances surrounding a case." The unique nature of sexual relationships counsels
that inferring "intent to infect" based on HIV-positive status, knowledge of the HIV-
positive status, and the occurrence of high-risk behavior could either be incredibly
easy or impossibly difficult to prove.
In the first instance, the prosecutor may effectively argue for a lowered intent to
facilitate conviction. The prosecutor could argue that the defendant's HIV-positive
status, knowledge of that status and the fact that he engaged in high-risk behavior
must implicitly mean that the defendant intended to transmit the virus. However,
the defendant may be ignorant as to what constitutes dangerous activity. Knowledge
of HIV-positive status equals neither awareness -of unsafe conduct nor desire to
harm one's partner. In effect, the prosecutor would be showing that the defendant
placed the victim in danger of death or serious bodily injury by consciously
disregarding risk to the victim. This mens rea as defined by the Model Penal Code
merely satisfies the intent requirement for "reckless endangerment,"'76 not "knowl-
edge."
Since many defendants will likely argue that they had no intent to transmit the
virus, conviction will frequently turn on the credibility of witnesses. In a situation
where the defendant is a homosexual or other highly discriminated-against minority,
the jury could conceivably convict based on the defendant's status as a homosexual
and not on the defendants guilt or innocence.
Should the court determine that the intent requirement is comparable to that of
a murder or manslaughter statute, then the prosecutor must meet an almost
insurmountable burden. Murder requires that the defendant know of his HIV-
positive status, believe his actions could transmit the virus, and desire the death of
the victim.7 Knowing or purposeful states of mind require the prosecution to at
least show that the defendant was almost practically certain his actions would cause
infection.78 In this situation, the defendant could claim he neither knew his activity
was dangerous nor intended or desired the infection of the victim. Absent an overt
manifestation of the defendant's desire to transmit IlV, guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt would be difficult to legitimately determine.
Enforcing the statute as written requires governmental intrusion into one of the
most personal aspects of human nature: the sexual relationship. This statute clearly
implicates one's right to maintain the confidentiality of his or her medical
condition.' This right to privacy, however, is not absolute.' One competing
74. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1992).
75. United States v. Fleming, 479 F.2d 56, 57 (10th Cir. 1973).
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1985).
77. Tierney, supra note 7, at 491.
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (1985).
79. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Woods v. National Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1965).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches
1993]
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policy is involved when another's health is put at stake.8 AIDS is surely a disease
that warrants intrusion into one's medical background. Therefore, an HIV test could
be used as evidence in a prosecution under this statute.
In Jacobsen v. Massachusetts,' the United States Supreme Court asserted that
a state legislature may protect the public health and safety even if such protection
would require restraint of individual constitutional rights.' In United States v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
medical records may be disclosed after considering many factors such as the type
of record requested, the likelihood of harm if there is nonconsensual disclosure, the
necessity of the records, public policy, and public interest." Clearly, a balancing
test must be used to determine whether the accused's interests outweigh those of the
state in preventing th further spread of HIV. Since the latter goal seems to be a
highly compelling state interest, it is likely that individual privacy will be
subordinated to the concerns of the government. However, Oklahoma's statute may
inappropriately allow the government to invade upon innocent people's private lives.
A law that "sweeps so broadly" may not legitimately fall under the rubric of
compelling state interest. Clearly, the right to privacy places significant barriers in
the path of enforcement of the statute.
Due to the uncertain definition of intent in the statute, prosecutors may be unsure
of the evidence required to convict. Assuming the statute requires the higher
specific intent, prosecutors would be faced with a virtually insurmountable burden.
This element causes common-sense problems of proof. Short of a blatant admission
by the defendant that he or she wanted to kill the victim, few situations exist where
specific intent can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, unless the court
determines that the intent may be inferred from the circumstances, this element will
be virtually impossible to prove. Should the court conclude that specific intent to
infect another may be inferred by conduct, constitutional concerns become entangled
in the argument.
The intent requirement in this statute poses a real threat of basing conviction on
the caprice of moral disapprobation or censure of a judge or jury. Such an intent
requirement should be made more specific to prevent unprotected minorities from
being convicted for tfeir minority status rather than for a criminal act.
2. The Necessary Act
A second problem with the statutory language concerns the conduct required for
conviction. The statute proscribes "conduct reasonably likely to result in the transfer
of the person's own blood, bodily fluids containing visible blood, semen or vaginal
secretions into the bloodstream of another, or through the skin or other membranes
and seizures.
81. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
82. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
83. Id. at 28.
84. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).




of another person."' This requirement, although limited to the known methods of
transmitting HIV, may not be sufficiently certain to warn people precisely of which
conduct is criminal and which is legal.
The statute does not require that bodily fluids actually be transferred from the
HIV-positive person to the partner. The conduct engaged in need be no more
certain or definite than that which is reasonably likely to result in the transfer of
bodily fluids. Imagine a situation where the HIV-positive defendant performs
unprotected oral sex on her male partner. Defendant has a cold sore on the inside
of her mouth. It is possible that blood from the cold sore could transfer from the
defendant through her boyfriend's urethra. However, it is highly unlikely that such
a transmission would result. It is also highly unlikely that a jury would convict
under these circumstances. Now imagine a homosexual couple engaging in the same
behavior. One must wonder whether the gay defendant would be convicted where
the heterosexual defendant would likely not be.
In this age of AIDS it would be difficult to assert that such a victim did not
assume the risk of contracting BIV when he or she initially consented to the
conduct. Situations where consent is an issue will become swearing matches
between the defendant and the victim. When the truth turns on a statement allegedly
made in the confines of one's own home prior to sexual intercourse, the judge or
jury will have to determine who is telling the truth. If this determination is wrong,
an innocent person may be convicted or a guilty one set free.
3. Vagueness
Some of the statute's defects that lead to problems of enforcement may also
undermine the statute's constitutionality. One such defect is that the statute deprives
the defendant of due process by failing to give sufficient warning of the proscribed
conductC In Grayned v. City of Rockford,s the Supreme Court articulated the test
for striking down a statute as void for vagueness grounds. Laws must be
sufficiently defined so as to (1) give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited; and (2) provide explicit standards for those
who apply them. 9 In addition, Justice Marshall stated that vague laws offend the
86. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1192.1 (Supp. 1992). Interestingly, the statute only criminalizes the attempt
to transmit HIV without proscribing the actual transmission of the virus.
87. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S 223, 230 (1951).
88. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
89. Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall stated:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free
to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second,
if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates the basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but
related, where a vague statue "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings
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First Amendment by forcing citizens to "steer far wider" of prohibited conduct than
necessary.'
As discussed, Oklahoma's statute fails to provide a sufficient definition of intent.
Although the language appears to require "knowing" intent, it is conceivable that a
lesser intent would suffice under the appropriate circumstances. Homosexuals,
intravenous drug users, and prostitutes would be especially vulnerable to prosecu-
tions. Thus, to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, the statute must be
made more explicit.91
The phrase "conduct reasonably likely to transfer" HIV is especially vulnerable
to attack. Situations exist where an overzealous prosecutor could charge someone
whose conduct was not "reasonably likely to transfer" HIV. Of special concern
would be a situation where members of hated minorities engaged in conduct
"reasonably likely," but took precautions. Since condoms are not fail safe and
homosexuals are easy targets for discrimination, a prosecutor may be allowed to
argue for a broad interpretation in order to convict.
Another concern arises when dealing with intravenous drug users. Is bleaching
a needle sufficient to remove sharing needles from the confines of "conduct
reasonably likely to transfer" bodily fluids? Since bleaching the needle may kill the
virus, one would think it is safe conduct. However, the statute refers to the transfer
of bodily fluids. Therefore, one could argue that sharing needles still transfers
bodily fluids of HIV-infected persons, notwithstanding the effective sterilization of
the needles. The judge or jury could substitute fear and ignorance for the intent
necessary to convict under the unclear language of the statute.
The possibility for .-xploitation of the Oklahoma statute because of its vague
terms is very real. Although abuse requires a combination of a discriminated-against
minority and a discrininatory government, this combination could result readily.
One must remember tat homosexuality in itself is not illegal, although sodomy is
illegal in some states. Oklahoma's statute could arguably be used to proscribe
homosexuality by interpreting the statute in accordance with such a goal. As Justice
Thurgood Marshall mentioned in Grayned, "where a vague statute 'abut[s] upon
sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the
exercise of [those] freedoms."'" The freedom of intimate association should not
be curtailed merely because the "governing majority in a state has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral."93
One must not overlook the public policy objectives behind enforcing an HIV-
specific criminal statue. One author mentions that public health officials are
convinced that public education and counselling about the modes of transmission
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ... than if the boundaries
of the forbidden zone were clearly marked.
Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 108.
92. Id at 109 (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) and Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 2:37 (1961)).




and methods of reducing risk, not the criminal law, should be the chief strategy for
preventing the spread of HIV.' The author argues that to be effective, such laws
must be clearly written and criminalize only conduct medically proven to transmit
HIV." Although the statute effectively achieves one public policy objective,
punishment, one must question whether such a goal with a minute impact can justify
the ancillary dangers inherent in the vague language. Since education seems to be
the primary goal of government, a criminal statute should be used to (1) inform the
public of the proscribed acts medically capable of transmitting HIV; (2) alleviate
public fears of casual contagion; and (3) encourage testing and participation in
counseling and treatment programs."
Oklahoma's statute either fails to address or specifically undermines these
purposes. Oklahoma's vague language regarding both the necessary intent and
conduct certainly falls to inform the public about the unlawful conduct. Such
ambiguous language could actually foment public fears because people could be
criminally liable for conduct they never realized was illegal. Additionally, the
statute fails to address public fears as to casual contagion. Although the statute
ostensibly limits criminal conduct to those activities medically proven to transmit
HIV, the language remains too vague to effectively inform people about otherwise
safe activity.
Finally, the statute also discourages people from seeking testing and treatment.
Because the statute potentially allows for extreme abuse of constitutional rights to
privacy, people may actively avoid testing either to limit liability or to preclude
possible future public disclosure of test results. Therefore, the goals of education
and counselling will be eviscerated should the statute ever be enforced beyond the
most limited circumstances evidencing the most culpable conduct. 7
A statute criminalizing the sexual transmission of HIV can justifiably be applied
to only a minute portion of society: those HIV-infected individuals who with malice
aforethought intentionally infect another with HIV. However, Oklahoma's statute as
written presents a high risk of convicting innocent people. Since the statute poses
severe threats of discrimination and arbitrary. enforcement resulting in the
undermining of legitimate state interests, the statute should either be rewritten or
repealed to avoid potentially drastic results.
IV. Equal Protection
A. Introduction
Enforcement of Oklahoma's statute may have a discriminatory impact on groups
who suffer disproportionately from the AIDS virus. One scholar has argued that
HIV-specific criminal statutes could become an instrument of official persecution
against gay men and intravenous drug users, simply because they are the largest
94. Tierney, supra note 7, at 475.
95. Id. at 487.
96. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 248.
97. See State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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group at risk for AIDS. This persecution could be manifested in harassment and
punishment - not for the commission of any crime - but for sexual orientation
or drug addiction. These laws would effectively criminalize the status of being
homosexual. Such laws would also essentially criminalize gay sex, even in
jurisdictions that have repealed sodomy laws."
B. Federal Equal Protection Doctrine
Under federal constitutional law, a court must determine whether the challenged
statute has a sufficiently legitimate purpose. Because all classifications are not
suspect, varying degrees of judicial scrutiny exist. Groups classified by race,
nationality, or alienag.z are considered a "suspect class," warranting the highest level
of scrutiny, "strict scrutiny."" When determining whether a group is a suspect
class under federal ccnstitutional law, the court considers several factors: whether
the group has suffered a history of purposeful discrimination, whether this
discrimination has bee.n invidious, and whether the group lacks sufficient political
power to redress their grievances from the political branches of government."'
Invidious discrimination is defined by determining: whether the trait which defines
the class bears any relation to ability to perform or contribute to society;'
whether the class has been burdened with unique difficulties due to prejudice or
inaccurate stereotypes; and whether the trait or characteristic defining the class is
immutable.'" The legislation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. In addition, higher scrutiny will be applied when the classification
encroaches on personal rights protected by the Constitution, commonly referred to
as fundamental rights.'"
Groups classified by gender or by the status of illegitimacy are considered "quasi-
suspect."'" The law creating the challenged classification will be subject to a
heightened scrutiny, although not as high a scrutiny as a suspect classification.'"
Classifications based on these traits must substantially relate to a legitimate state
interest to survive constitutional attack.'"
The final classification reserved for remaining groups merits the lowest level of
scrutiny. Under this test, the classification will be presumed valid and will
withstand review if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.'"
Sexual orientation discrimination cases have been challenged in a number of
instances through equal protection arguments.'" However, before addressing equal
98. Tiemey, supra note 7, at 489.
99. Id.
100. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr. 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
101. Id. at 440-42.
102. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
103. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-44; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685-87.
104. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
105. Id. at 440-41.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 440.




protection status for gays, it is necessary to first address Bowers v. Hardwick."'
1. Bowers v. Hardwick
Writing for a 5-4 majority in Hardwick, Justice White determined that homosexu-
als do not have a constitutional right of privacy to engage in sodomy."' The court
explicitly confined their holding and discussion to the privacy issue, refusing to
address whether gays have heightened rights under the equal protection clause."'
In the wake of the Hardwick decision, many scholars have attacked the Court's
holding."' Professor Anne B. Goldstein determined in an exhaustive study that the
majority of the Court based their conclusion on inaccurate historical conceptions of
homosexuality and sodomy."' By acting on this misconception, the Court was able
to "make a profound change in constitutional interpretation, from the liberal to the
conservative paradigm, without acknowledging either that it had done so or the
implications of the shift.""' Professor Nan D. Hunter has argued that the
Hardwick decision attempts to delineate a difference between homosexuals and
heterosexuals in the very acts which they share in common."6 Hunter cites the
incidence of homosexual and heterosexual sodomy as support."7 Judge Norris of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals argues that Hardwick had nothing to do with
equal protection."' He believes it is clearly incorrect to expand the Hardwick
holding to preempt equal protection arguments. Under Judge Norris' argument, a
right to privacy and equal protection under the laws are distinct legal concepts. By
Ben-Shalom v. March, 881 F. 2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 8 F.3d 57
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
110. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
111. Id. at 191.
112. Id. at 188 n.2. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
531 (1992); Roderick W. Lewis, Note, Watkins v. U.S. Army and Bowers v. Hardwick: Are Homosexuals
a Suspect Class or Second Class Citizens?, 68 NEB. L. REv. 851 (1989); Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick,
97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Tracey Rich, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REV. 773 (1988); Shelley R. Wieck, Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes
in the Context of Homosexual Activity After Bowers v. Hardwick, 32 S.D. L. REV. 323 (1987).
113. See supra note 112.
114. Goldstein, supra note 112, at 1103. It is beyond the scope of this comment to adequately
discuss these misconceptions.
115. Id.
116. Hunter, supra note 112, at 544.
117. Id. Data indicates that between 96% and 99% of homosexuals engage in oral sex with a
smaller proportion engaging in anal sex. PHItP BLUMsTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES
236, 242 (1983). Between 90 and 93% of heterosexuals have engaged in oral sex and a smaller
proportion in anal sex. Id.
118. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 723 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); see also
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370-71 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990); Lewis, supra note 112, at 854.
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failing to recognize this premise, states may be given the authority to pass laws that
impose special restrictions on gays." 9
Despite these arguments, many courts have latched onto Hardwick as a
justification to deny equal protection status to homosexuals. 2 ' In High Tech Gays
v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,' the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused a Fifch Amendment Equal Protection challenge to the Department
of Defense's policy of denying high security clearances to gay members of the
military." The court in High Tech Gays interpreted Hardwick to mean that
"homosexual activity is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process
and that the proper standard of review under the Fifth Amendment is rational basis
review.""3
The Ninth Circuit determined that it would be "incongruous" to expand the
doctrine of Equal Protection to include a fundamental right of homosexual conduct
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 24 The court continued with the circular reasoning that because
homosexual conduct can be criminalized, gays and lesbians cannot constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class and consequently cannot be given heightened
protection under the Equal Protection doctrine."z The Seventh, the D.C., and the




Although Hardwick and its progeny have made an equal protection argument
under federal law a formidable task, the door has not yet been indisputably shut.
In Watkins v. United States Army," the Ninth Circuit held that gays constitute a
suspect class and warrant strict scrutiny." Although the court, sitting en banc,
later withdrew its earlier holding and upheld on estoppel grounds, 2 ' Judge Norris
provided an excellent argument for classifying gays as a suspect class.
Judge Norris argued that discrimination against homosexuals is clearly no less
"pernicious" or severe than the discrimination faced by other groups already treated
as suspect classes, such as aliens or people of a particular national origin.'"3 Other
courts have acknowledged the hatred and bigotry to which homosexuals are
subject.''
119. Watkins, 875 F.22 at 723.
120. See supra note 109.
121. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).




126. See supra note 109.
127. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988).
128. Id. at 1352.
129. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711 (9th Cir. 1989).
130. Id. at 724 (Norris, J., concurring).




In Commonwealth v. Wasson," a social historian testifying as an expert witness
offered extensive evidence of the purposeful discrimination suffered by homosexu-
als."' Recent examples of the bigotry and hatred suffered by homosexuals are
illustrated by the attempts at discriminating against homosexuals through state
amendments." In Oregon, voters had the opportunity to pass a state constitutional
amendment that would discourage homosexuality and classify it as "abnormal,
wrong, unnatural, and perverse."3s The bombing of a gay man's and lesbian
woman's Oregon house by teenagers was attributed to the perception of the race,
color, and sexual orientation of the victims; this perception was in turn attributed
in part to the bigotry underlying the proposed amendment to the state's constitu-
tion." The man had been gay-bashed less than a month before. He and his
lesbian roommate died in the blast.1' Similar amendments have been proposed in
Colorado and Maine. 3 California, Idaho, Ohio, and Washington are states which
could be facing similar attempts at "putting bigotry to a vote" in the future.'39
Thus, homosexuals have been subjected to a history of purposeful discrimination
and continue to be discriminated against.
The second consideration addressed when determining whether a class may be
considered suspect is whether the discrimination suffered by the class can be termed
invidious. In making this determination, one factor of note is whether the trait
which defines the class bears any relation to the ability to perform or contribute to
society. If the trait bears no such relation, then the discrimination may be invidious.
In Watkins, the soldier had an exemplary record."4 Even the military conceded
that Watkins' ability to perform was in no way hampered by his sexual orienta-
tion. 4'
One must also consider whether classifications based on sexual orientation reflect
prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes. This factor is also satisfied, as evidenced by
Oregon's attempt at terming homosexuals as "abnormal, wrong, unnatural or
perverse." Prominent sex researchers have determined that homosexuality is not
immoral, perverse, or deviate; rather, they have determined homosexuality exists in
dissenting) (stating that homosexuality "evoke[s] deeply felt prejudices and fears on the part of many
people") , cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340,
1345 (Wash.) ("A majority of people and adults in this country react negatively to homosexuality.")
(quoting a sociologist's testimony at trial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
132. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
133. Shirley A. Wiegand et al., Part of the Moving Stream: State Constitutional Law, Sodomy, and
Beyond, 81 KY. LJ. 449 (1993).
134. The Oregon Trail of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at A2; Anna Quindlen, Putting Hatred
to a Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1992, at A26.
135. Quindlen, supra note 134. The measure failed on November 3, 1992, by a narrow majority.
136. Id.
137. John Gallagher, The Rise of Fascism in America, THE ADVOcATE, Nov. 3, 1992, at 38.
138. The Oregon Trail of Hate, supra note 134.
139. Gallagher, supra note 137.
140. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
141. Id.
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all societies and is normal to that extent." However, irrational fears, prejudice and
inaccurate stereotypes still exist.
The final factor considered when determining invidious discrimination is whether
homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. Scientific data indicates that humans
maintain little control over sexual orientation and that sexual orientation is virtually
immune to change. 43 Although homosexuals can cease the activity which outwardly
identifies their class, they cannot change their inward attractions to the same sex."4
It would be as difficult for homosexuals to change their sexual orientation as it would
be for heterosexuals. Since sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic, irrational
fears, prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes concerning homosexuality still exist, and
since one's sexual orientation bears no relation to one's ability to perform or contribute
to society, discrimination. against homosexuals is appropriately termed invidious.
The third consideration when determining suspect class status concerns whether
homosexuals faced with official discrimination lack the political power necessary to
obtain redress from the political branches of government."5 Judge Norris acknowl-
edged that homosexuals cannot protect their political rights because of the very nature
of the discrimination: "the very fact that homosexuals have historically been under
represented in and victimized by political bodies is itself strong evidence that they lack
the political power necessary to ensure fair treatment at the hands of government.""
Judge Norris emphatically determined that these social and political pressures force
people to conceal their sexual orientation, thereby, preventing effective representa-
tion.47 In fact, "coming out of the closet" to assert one's rights against discrimination
merely exposes people to the very biases and hatred they are attempting to battle."4
The result is "that the voices of many are not even heard, let alone counted.""' 9
Homosexuals meet the requirements necessary to be considered a suspect class.
Homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful discrimination. This discrimination
constitutes a gross unfairness sufficiently inconsistent with the ideals of equal
protection to consider the discrimination invidious. As a result, homosexuals have
been unable to assert political power in a manner that effectively allows them to
obtain redress from official discrimination.
C. Oklahoma's More Sensitive Commitment to Equal Protection
The use of state constitutional law has become increasingly popular when the
federal law fails. 5" It is well recognized that state constitutions may afford more
142. See PAUL ROBINSON, THE MODERNIZATION OF SEX (1989). Not all researchers in this field
embrace this author's view.
143. See Harris M. Miller II, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 817-21 (1984).
144. Id. This issue remains a point of contention among experts in this field.









heightened rights than those allowed by the federal constitution.' The only
limitation placed on state courts by federal constitutional law is that the state may
not provide lesser rights than those afforded by the federal constitution." States
may follow a more expanded view of constitutional law than that which is followed
by the federal courts." Following state constitutional law instead of federal law
is favored by Justice Brennan: "[s]tate constitutions .. .are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law."'"4 These elevated rights are the product of
many influences. Many state constitutions were written before the federal Bill of
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the incorporation doctrine. 55 Also, many
state constitutions are heavily copied from other state constitutions rather than the
federal Constitution. 56
Although excellent arguments exist for deeming gays a suspect class under the
United States Constitution, the Hardwick decision and the subsequent erroneous
applications by other federal courts have made the obstacle to enhanced rights great
indeed. Overcoming this encumbrance, state courts have applied their state
constitution and found enhanced rights for homosexuals.'"
In Commonwealth v. Wasson,' the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently struck
down that state's sodomy statute." Relying solely on state constitutional
grounds, . the court reasoned in its equal protection analysis that the sodomy
statute discriminated against sexual orientation, not the act of sodomy.' The
interests of the government failed to satisfy the court, terming the purposes of the
statute "simply outrageous."'" The Kentucky .court clearly believed that gays merit
a higher scrutiny."
Likewise, in Michigan v. Bullock, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down
a statute as being cruel and unusual punishment.64 Michigan's constitution
provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be
151. Id.
152. See John C. Cooper, Boosting Your Case with Your State Constitution, 72 A.B.A. J. 49 (1986).
153. Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Okla. 1980) (Opala, J., concurring).
See generally Wiegand, supra note 133.
154. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
155. Wiegand, supra note 133, at 451.
156. Id.
157. See Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 487 (holding sodomy statute unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection and privacy, and implicitly determining gays are suspect); Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979) (using state equal protection doctrine to strike down
discriminatory statute).
158. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).
159. Id. at 491-92.
160. Id. at 489.
161. Id. at 500.
162. Id. at 501.
163. Viegand, supra note 133, at 451.
164. 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992).
165. See Wiegand, supra note 133, at 452.
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imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained."'" The United States Constitution reads: "Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."'" In holding that the Michigan statute at issue violated the
state constitution, Bullock illustrates the reality that slight textual variations between
the state and federal constitutions can result in different treatment of similarly
situated defendants."
Oklahoma's constitution is no exception to these trends. It was written in 1907,
the year Oklahoma gained statehood. Although Oklahoma's constitution bears
many similarities to the federal constitution, the federal constitution copied what the
Founding Fathers considered to be the "best" features of the original thirteen states'
constitutions." Oklahoma's constitution was influenced by other state constitutions
as well as the progre;sive climate of the times."7 In fact, the constitution strongly
resembled that which was written at the pre-statehood Sequoyah Convention, which
in turn was heavily copied from other state constitutions."
Generally, Oklahoma's constitution evinces a more expansive outlook towards
individual rights. This is illustrated by the constitution's length, its Bill of Rights,
and its treatment of saffrage. Most constitutions prior to 1907 were around fifteen
thousand words long." By contrast, Oklahoma's constitution was around fifty
thousand words long. 4 Within this expansive length is found another indicator
of commitment to pe:,sonal liberties.
Most state constitutions' Bill of Rights list twenty to thirty enumerated rights.'
Oklahoma, however, surpasses this trend by enumerating thirty-three rights.'
Finally, Oklahoma's constitutional commitment to individual rights can be found in
a 1918 amendment extending suffrage to women." This expansion of women's
rights occurred two years before the federal government recognized the right in the
federal constitution. 71
In keeping with this tradition of heightened awareness -of individual liberties,
Oklahoma case law has embraced a "more sensitive" view of equal protection.'7
Although no overt equal protection clause exists in Oklahoma's Constitution, article
166. MICH. CONST. alt. 1, § 16 (emphasis added).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
168. See Wiegand, supra note 133.
169. DAVID R. MORGAN Er AL., OKLAHOMA POLITICS AND POLICIES: GOVERNING THE SOONER
STATE 68 (1991).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 68-75.
172. Id. at 68.
173. Id. at 69.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 70.
177. Id. at 71.
178. Id.
179. See Harry F. Tepker, The Trouble with Pool Halls: Rationality and Equal Protection in




H, section 7 has been interpreted as a like guarantee." Article II, section 2 has
also been cited as a guardian of equality in Oklahoma.'
Oklahoma's "more sensitive" view of equal protection is best discussed within the
framework of Callaway v. City of Edmond," a 1990 decision. In Callaway, an
Edmond city ordinance prohibited pool halls and similar establishments from
allowing children under the age of eighteen on the premises. Since age is neither
a suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class, the ordinance could only violate equal
protection if it failed to bear any conceivable, rational relation to a legitimate public
purpose. The trial court in Callaway acknowledged the city's authority to limit or
prohibit the operation of pool halls within city limits" and considered the curbing
of gambling a legitimate public purpose."8 Yet the Court of Criminal Appeals
struck down the ordinance, holding that it violated the provisions of equal protection
under Oklahoma case law and the state constitution.' The court stated that the
ordinance did not bear a rational relationship to the ultimate objective of regulating
gambling.t" When one examines federal constitutional law surrounding equal
protection analysis, one could likely (and prematurely) conclude that the Court of
Criminal Appeals arrived at an erroneous decision, disparate from any possible
support in precedent. However, exploration of Oklahoma state equal protection law
reveals that Callaway is merely an extension of an already well established tradition
of a "more-sensitive" view of equal protection in Oklahoma. This view has resulted
in an expansion of individual liberties in Oklahoma and, thus, an expansion of
equality.
The Callaway court realized that curtailing gambling was a legitimate public
purpose."U However, the court refused to believe that the ordinance was rationally
related to forwarding this legitimate public purpose, inhibiting gambling."S In
addition, the court determined that the ordinance was too broad and an unjustifiable
effort at protecting the city's youth from "certain unhealthy influences."'" Thus,
the ordinance was violative of equal protection in Oklahoma.
To better understand the Callaway court's decision, one must consider the spirit
of equal protection steeped in tradition and precedent in Oklahoma. In Thayer v.
Phillips Petroleum,' Justice Opala referred to this spirit and tradition:
180. See, e.g., Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla. Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1148 (Okla. 1987). The
Oklahoma Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
181. See Tepker, supra note 179, at 154 n.13. The Oklahoma Constitution provides: "All persons
have the inherent right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the gains of their
own industry." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 2.
182. 791 P.2d 104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
183. Id. at 106.
184. Id. at 107.
185. Id. at 106-07.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 107.
188. ld.
189. Id.
190. 613 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1980).
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Oklahoma has adhered, since 1908, to a more sensitive view of the
XIVth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause .... Oklahoma's
commitment to its own, more sensitive version of equal protection [has]
survived [more limited federal interpretations]. The federal constitution
does not prohibit the state from following a more expanded view of
restraints than that mandated by the U. S. Supreme Court. We should
therefore give continued validity to our [case law adopting this
view]."
The 1908 case to which Justice Opala was referring is Chicago, R.L & P. Ry. Co.
v. Mashore.'9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Mashore struck down an
attorney's fees statute that allowed prevailing plaintiffs but not prevailing defendants
to recover fees in ceran situations.'" In its holding, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted the words of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations: "Those who make the
laws are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the
countryman at plow. This is a maxim of constitutional law.""' Following this line
of reasoning, the court in Mashore determined that the defendant was not on equal
footing with his adversary, and subsequently struck down the statute.195
In Wilson v. Foster,'" the Supreme Court of Oklahoma continued to follow the
spirit of more - rather than less - equality by holding that consolidating
matrimonial action custody cases with actions brought by a noncustodial parent to
declare the child depr'ived violated equal protection.'" In this case, a mother who
was faced with such a consolidation was deprived of a jury trial because the action
brought by her ex-husband was a non-jury proceeding.'98 The court in this case
generally affirmed its commitment to individual liberties by asserting that
classifications must not be arbitrary or capricious.'" The equal protection clause,
the court reaffirmed, is intended to protect individuals from such arbitrary
discrimination by the government.'
Viewing the Callaway decision through the lens focused by Mashore, Wilson and
other similar cases,"° Callaway becomes clear: Oklahoma is dedicated to a more
fundamental, expansive, and "sensitive" view of equal protection. Callaway is not
an aberration, flaunting its singular inconsistencies in the face of federal equal
protection analysis. Father, Callaway merely affirms the existence of a commit
191. Id. at 1045 (Opaia, J., concurring).
192. 96 P. 630 (Olda. 1908).
193. Id. at 635.
194. Id. at 633 (quoting Cooley, supra note 1, at 483).
195. Id.
196. 595 P.2d 1329 (Okla. 1979).
197. Id. at 1333.
198. Il
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1332.
201. See Parkhill Truck Co. v. Reynolds, 359 P.2d 1064, 1067-68 (Okla. 1961); Keaton v. Branch,




ment in Oklahoma to a rudimentary principal upon which the United States was
founded: equality.
Applying the Callaway holding and its predecessors to Oklahoma's statute
criminalizing the intentional transmission of HIV, it becomes evident that this
statute offends the sensitive aspirations of Oklahoma's equal protection doctrine.
The prevention of the spread of HIV and AIDS is certainly a legitimate public
purpose. However, like Callaway, the issue does not revolve around the legitimacy
of the purpose being promoted, but turns on whether Oklahoma's statute is rationally
related to the ultimate objective of regulating the spread of HIV. More importantly,
the statute must not offend the concept upon which equal protection is premised,
equality, and the case law through which the more sensitive equal protection
doctrine is embraced.
The Oklahoma statute exercises grave injustices against those carrying the AIDS
virus. More specifically, the statute allows for the high likelihood of discrimination
against homosexuals. Homosexuals are not only the highest group at risk of AIDS;
homosexuals are also a unique minority who experience the fear, ignorance, and
disapprobation of many members of society. These characteristics coupled with the
lack of political power in the state creates a dismal combination.
The statute as written is likely to discourage testing and treatment by those at risk
for the disease and by those already infected with HIV. By allowing for the
prosecution of HIV-positive individuals under the highly flawed provisions of the
statute, the statute may ironically increase the spread of BIV. Since HIV is a highly
stigmatized virus and because homosexuals and others with HIV will fear
prosecution based on an ambiguous statute, treatment and testing will be skirted.
Prosecutions will become "swearing contests" between the defendant and the alleged
victim, the outcome turning on the more credible witness. Because inherent biases
may sway the fact finder, people will be convicted based on a condition or a status,
not on the merits of the case or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Although such
injustice may not become a pervasive phenomenon, the likelihood of just one
conviction based on prejudice and facilitated by the inadequacies of the statute
warrants revision of Oklahoma's law. Even one conviction of an innocent person
because of their status as a homosexual or as an HIV carrier affronts the equal
protection doctrine as well as the judicial system as a whole.
By applying Oklahoma's more expansive view of equal protection, the state can
acknowledge the shortcomings of the statute and begin to correct its flaws. The
legitimate public purpose behind the statute will then begin to be promoted. Educating
people about AIDS and HIV and protecting people from the intentional transmission
of HIV are the legitimate goals of a properly worded statute. These goals cannot be
segregated. A statute must be written with education in mind. Only for the most
onerous acts should criminal prosecution be allowed. A statute which discriminates
against an unprotected minority and undermines the very purpose underlying the
statute is not the solution to an epidemic. It is merely a response to the fear, hatred,
and ignorance surrounding the disease and those infected with it. Society must
overcome these hurdles in order to address AIDS with intelligence and foresight.
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One way to begin this process is to confront the statute's inadequacies. By
addressing the concerns and problems outlined in this text, the statute will more
appropriately provide for education while deterring the most severe acts warranting
criminal sanction.
V. Proposed Revisions
This comment suggests bifurcation of the statute into one allowing criminal
penalties and one providing civil treatment and counseling. The criminal statute would
apply only in those situations evidencing the presence of malice aforethought or an
equally guilty state of mind. The civil statute should address those situations where
an HIV-positive person engages in negligent or reckless conduct in violation of the
provisions of the civil statute. The civil statute would also provide for criminal
sanctions for those who continually violate the civil statute's provisions.
Criminal sanctions for HIV transmission is not an adequate remedy for curtailing
an epidemic. Education should be the prevalent means by which the spread of HIV
is appropriately addressed. Also, some people engage in more culpable and onerous
activity with the specific intent of transmitting HIV. These situations warrant criminal
punishment. However, a delicate balance must be struck between individual liberties
and the public goal of limiting the spread of HIV. To do so requires more focus on
education than on criminal sanction and requires some sacrifices in the process.
A. Criminal Punishment
The criminal portion of the statute should specify the intent element and should
punish only the most culpable of individuals. Otherwise, privacy, equal protection, and
witness credibility immediately become unassailable obstacles. The winner becomes
the most credible and the most convincing witness. The loser becomes the right to
privacy, the right to equal protection of the laws, and dignity. IV-transmission trials
will become a counterpart to date-rape trials, with all the accompanying implications.
However, in analyzing the situation, one must realize that this area is the source of
most of the flaws of the original statute and, unfortunately, any statute which attempts
to regulate consensual sexual intercourse should be highly scrutinized.
Revisions to the criminal statute should begin with a specific definition of the
necessary intent to avoid any inconsistencies. Language stating that the intent should
be evidenced by malice aforethought or the presence of a depraved and malignant
heart could be added to clarify the intent standard. Also, the necessary act should be
limited to those acts medically capable of transmitting IV. This provision would
eliminate the ambiguities of the current statute, which merely require that the
transmission of bodily fluids be reasonably likely. Therefore, biting or spitting cases,
where blood is not transferred or the skin is not broken, will not fit within the
parameters of the proposed revision.
The focus should b- placed on education rather than punishment. By limiting the
criminal sanctions available, the purpose of the statute will be better served. Likewise,
by focusing on education, society as a whole will become more aware of the
characteristics of the disease, resulting in fewer cases of HN and fewer instances





For those actions that do not rise to the level of a violent felony evidencing the
malicious intent to infect another with HIV, a statute providing counseling and
treatment is proposed.
This statute would fall under the authority of the Department of Health and Public
Safety. The statute would be part of article 5, which deals with disease prevention and
control. The civil statute would provide for situations where the intent is difficult to
determine or absent. It should be designed to encourage people to determine their Iv
status prior to engaging in sexual intercourse. By providing civil sanction for
situations where the defendant engaged in the requisite conduct while being HIV-
positive without inquiring into the defendant's mental state, individuals will be
encouraged to actively seek treatment and testing.
The statute would also require a complaining witness. This provision safeguards
against unnecessary intrusions into people's private lives. It places the decision to
make public what is usually private on the shoulders of the victim. Granted, should
the victim decide to remain silent, then the acts will remain unfettered until someone
does complain. However, since the proceedings would be entirely confidential, there
should be little reason for a complaining witness not to come forth with a good faith
claim. Likewise, the process would include provisions for testing the defendant and
would also be confidential.
By giving the power to act against negligent or reckless conduct in this manner,
people will become educated while being deterred from future unsafe conduct. At the
same time, by bifurcating civil prosecutions from criminal ones, the problems plaguing
Oklahoma's current statute are more effectively addressed. While the proposed statutes
do not profess to solve all problems surrounding the HIV epidemic, criminalization
of HIV transmission, and educating the public, the proposed revisions do address these
shortcomings in a manner that significantly decreases the current statute's flaws.
VI. Conclusion
Oklahoma's statute criminalizing the sexual transmission of IV, although a noble
attempt at preventing a perceived danger, falls far short of the mark. Preventing the
spread of HIV is certainly a compelling state interest. Punishing the intentional
transmission of HIV is even more compelling.
However, the state must arrive at a fragile balance between individual liberties
and the abbreviation of the spread of HIV and AIDS. A statute that implicates,
rather than protects, individual liberties fails to effectively achieve the state goal.
Likewise, a statute that undermines the very purpose it is meant to serve most
certainly frustrates the government's aspirations.
Perhaps more importantly, a statute which discriminates against a minority
violates a basic proposition upon which the United States was founded: equality.
Such a statute undeniably denigrates Oklahoma's commitment to equality through
its more sensitive view of equal protection doctrine. Oklahoma's statute clearly
violates equal protection by discriminating against a minority deserving status as a
suspect class: homosexuals.
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Education is the most formidable weapon to fight the spread of HIV. Although
the intentional transmission of the disease is repugnant, the ramifications of
criminalizing those acts in a manner tainted by vagueness and fear are perhaps even
more loathsome. By educating people about HIV and AIDS and its modes and
methods of transmission, people will be protected from their own ignorance as well
as that of their partners. Striking out against the people most strongly affected by
the disease is not the answer. To overcome or at least limit the spread of the
disease, society must act responsibly and realistically. Education is the first step
towards achieving thi; end.
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